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1. Christopher J.W. Zorn, U.S. Government Litigation Strategies in the Federal Appellate
Courts 1 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with Main
Library, Ohio State University).
2. For the first three years of the new century, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (www.uscourts.gov) reports that the federal government was a plaintiff or
defendant in 23.1% (2001), 20.7% (2002), and 18.8% (2003) of civil cases commenced in the
United States District Courts.  See statistics at http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2003/dectables/
C01Dec03.pdf (2003); http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2002/dectables/c01dec02.pdf (2002);
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2001/dectables/c01dec01.pdf (2001).  In addition, in certain
specialized federal courts, most particularly the United States Court of Federal Claims and the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the federal government is a party to every
case on the docket.
3. Zorn, supra note 1, at 2.
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Because it is the quintessential repeat-player in federal litigation, the federal
government exerts a powerful influence on the federal courts and the
development of legal doctrine.  As political scientist Christopher J.W. Zorn has
observed, because of its ubiquitous presence in federal litigation, “more than
any other entity, the federal government plays a central role in the development
of law and policy in the United States courts.”   Both in terms of quantity (the1
federal government being a party to between one-fifth and one-quarter of all the
civil cases filed in the federal courts ) and quality (many of these cases have a2
substantial impact upon the real lives of people and public policy) federal
government litigation is distinctive in its importance.  “[C]ourt cases involving
the United States typically involve the most consequential issues for people’s
lives”  through claims involving personal injury; civil rights; social welfare3
benefits; health, safety, and environmental regulation; immigration;
governmental expropriation of property; and contractual obligations.
Any lawyer who practices regularly in the federal courts eventually will
encounter the federal government as a party and will learn, as the Supreme
Court stated nearly sixty years ago, “[i]t is too late in the day to urge that the
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11. See infra Part IV.
Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with
liability.”   The United States is hardly a typical litigant, as it benefits from a4
plethora of special procedures, defenses, and limitations on liability not
available to others.  Indeed, the federal government may not be subjected to suit
at all absent its own express consent pursuant to the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity.  This article addresses that doctrine.
The concept of “sovereign immunity” — that is, the immunity of the
government from suit without its express permission — underlies and
permeates the field of litigation with the federal government.  Sovereign
immunity lies always in the background, even when Congress has granted
consent to suit.  As Justice Holmes admonished nearly a century ago, “[m]en
must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.”   Yet, far too5
often, attorneys representing clients against the government fail to heed — or
even recognize — this classic proverb of federal government litigation, because
they fail to appreciate the persisting influence of sovereign immunity.  Even
when the government has waived sovereign immunity through legislation, the
doctrine influences the manner in which the courts interpret and apply such
statutes.
As a threshold question, we should ask why the federal government should
be treated differently from other litigants in the federal courts.  This article
presents that basic inquiry and summarizes the different answers that the courts
and leading commentators have offered.  May the sovereign government be
sued without its consent?   Why or why not?  What justification is there for6
holding the government immune from suit?   Is sovereign immunity an archaic7
remnant from the era of monarchy and the autocratic view that the king could
do no wrong?  Can the concept be defended in the context of a republican
democracy?  If so, how?  What are the historical origins of the concept?   How8
has sovereign immunity evolved as a doctrine?   Are there any exceptions to9
immunity?   What are they and can they be justified?  How does and should the10
doctrine of sovereign immunity affect the approach or attitude taken by the
courts toward a statute that arguably authorizes governmental liability in a
particular context?   Should such a statute be interpreted in the same manner11
as any other legislation or instead be construed strictly and narrowly?
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12. See also infra Part III.B.
13. Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:  Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 521 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1809)).
14. Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 384
(1970).
15. Id. at 395.
By looking at the concept of sovereign immunity and the circumstances
under which the federal government has consented to suit against itself, we
consider the legitimacy of governmental immunity in a democratic society and
the proper role of courts in resolving policy issues raised in suits against the
federal government.  We also learn much about a system of government by
examining when and how that government responds (or fails to respond) to
injuries inflicted by its agents or activities upon its own citizens.12
Professor Vicki C. Jackson, in her analysis of the principled or prudential
reasons for judicial recognition of the limitation on suits against the federal
government, describes sovereign immunity as “a place of contest between
important values of constitutionalism”:
On the one hand, constitutionalism entails a commitment that
government should be limited by law and accountable under law for
the protection of fundamental rights; if the “essence of civil liberty”
is that the law provide remedies for violations of rights, immunizing
government from ordinary remedies is in considerable tension with
all but the most formalist understandings of law and rights.  On the
other hand, a commitment to democratic decisionmaking may
underlie judicial hesitation about applying the ordinary law of
remedies to afford access to the public fisc to satisfy private claims,
in the absence of clear legislative authorization.13
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis was one of the nation’s leading experts on
administrative law — and a sharp critic of sovereign immunity.  He
characterized the concept as a medieval holdover from the English monarchy
and said that the “strongest support for sovereign immunity is provided by that
four-horse team so often encountered — historical accident, habit, a natural
tendency to favor the familiar, and inertia.”   He contended that the doctrine of14
sovereign immunity is unnecessary as a “judicial tool,” because we may trust
the courts to refrain from interfering in crucial governmental activities, such as
the execution of foreign affairs and military policies, by limiting themselves to
matters appropriate for judicial determination and within the competence of the
judiciary.   Writing more recently, and similarly questioning the historical and15
constitutional justifications for federal sovereign immunity, Professor Susan
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Randall contends that sovereign immunity should henceforth be viewed as “a
prudential rather than a jurisdictional doctrine,” under which “courts attempt to
balance the needs of the political branches to govern effectively with the rights
of the citizenry to redress governmental violations of law.”16
In response, Dean Harold J. Krent contends that “[m]uch of sovereign
immunity . . . derives not from the infallibility of the state but from a desire to
maintain a proper balance among the branches of the federal government, and
from a proper commitment to majoritarian rule.”   He explains that, by making17
the federal sovereign amenable to suit only when it has consented by statute,
society entrusts Congress as the representative of the people with determining
the appropriate circumstances under which public concerns should bow to
private complaints.   However, when government conduct becomes removed18
from policymaking, the arguments for sovereign immunity are at their weakest.
Thus, when mundane government activity is involved, devoid of policy
implications, the public should expect legislative waivers readily to be adopted.
Reserving the authority to waive sovereign immunity to Congress does not
mean that government is left without a check upon its conduct.  Rather, the
check is a political one — the potential displeasure of the electorate.19
Surely every reasonable person must agree that, because the federal
government represents the whole community and thus often must act in ways
that a private party cannot or should not, the government’s exposure to liability
must be controlled.  A single individual cannot be permitted in every instance
to obtain judicial relief that sets aside the decisions of the community duly
made through the elected branches of government.  Accordingly, the real
question underlying sovereign immunity is who gets to decide what those
limitations should be.  The disagreement between those who decry the very
existence of sovereign immunity, and those who accept it as an essential
starting point, may come down to asking “who do you trust.”  Those who
would abolish sovereign immunity outright trust the courts both to ensure a
remedy and to refrain when it is imprudent for the judiciary to act.  By contrast,
those who defend the concept of sovereign immunity as a limitation on judicial
inference of a cognizable cause of action against the government see this
constraint as a reflection of trust in the political branches of government to
determine the appropriate occasions for consenting to suit.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss3/3
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II. The History of Federal Sovereign Immunity
A. The Early Historical Origins of Federal Sovereign Immunity in the United
States
Whether federal sovereign immunity and its jurisprudential cousin, state
sovereign immunity, were accepted premises underlying — or instead intended
casualties of — the ratification of the United States Constitution remains the
subject of continued debate on the Supreme Court and among constitutional
historians and scholars.  The Supreme Court has adopted the former
understanding as to both federal and state sovereign immunity, and federal
sovereign immunity in particular has become a well-established and
foundational doctrine in this field of law.
The conventional account of the pertinent history, and the one accepted by
the majority of the present Supreme Court, holds that “[w]hen the Constitution
was ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not be
sued without consent in its courts.”20
As evidence that the framers deliberately preserved this English practice in
the constitutional framework, prominent members of the founding generation,
such as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, publicly
endorsed the concept of sovereign immunity during the ratification process for
the United States Constitution.  In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton wrote that
“[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.”   Madison, who played a leading role in the21
drafting of the Constitution at the convention, later told the Virginia ratification
convention that Article III merely allowed a suit involving a state party, if
initiated or permitted by the state, to be heard in federal court, but did not
confer upon any individual the power “to call any state into court.”   Marshall,22
who would later become Chief Justice of the United States, likewise assured the
Virginia convention that “[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power
should be dragged before a court.”   In Welch v. Texas Department of23
Highways & Public Transportation,  the Supreme Court stated that “the24
representations of Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall that the Constitution did
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not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity may have been essential to
ratification.”25
If the states were exempt from unconsented suit on this historical account,
then all the more so was the federal government.  When Justice Joseph Story
wrote his famous treatise on the Constitution in 1840, he explained that the
Article III grant of judicial power “to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party,”  was designed only to allow the federal government to sue as26
plaintiff to enforce its own rights, powers, contracts, and privileges.27
By contrast, the minority position on the modern Supreme Court insists that
“[t]here is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought
sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable,” and
contends that a diversity of views regarding the concept were displayed during
the ratification process.   These members of the Court need not be understood28
to deny the very concept of state sovereign immunity, but rather to dispute the
circumstances under which that immunity may be overridden.   In their view,29
Congress, in creating a new federal cause of action, may preempt state
sovereign immunity, just as Congress may pierce federal sovereign immunity
by enacting a statutory waiver.   In other words, rather than disputing the30
existence of state sovereign immunity, these Justices contest the intensity or
absoluteness of that immunity in the face of other considerations, especially
intervening federal legislation.
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31. Randall, supra note 16, at 3.
32. Id. at 38 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
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CHOICE 71-78 (2005); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About
the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393 (2005).
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38. Jackson, supra note 13, at 545.
39. Id. at 546.
Professor Susan Randall goes a step further and argues that, even prior to any
statutory abridgment, “the founding generation did not intend state sovereign
immunity and instead viewed the ratification of the Constitution as consent to
Article III suits by the states individually and collectively for the United
States.”   With respect to federal sovereign immunity, Randall reads the Article31
III extension of judicial power over “Controversies to which the United States
shall be a party,” as a clear grant of judicial authority to hear suits against the
federal government.   Rather than merely bestowing jurisdiction, she contends,32
“[t]he term ‘judicial power’ is a broad and encompassing term” that “extends
to the national judiciary a fundamental governmental authority” that supersedes
sovereign immunity.   Although she acknowledges the contrary statements of33
certain prominent members of the founding generation, Randall argues that “the
interpretation advanced by Hamilton, Madison and Marshall is contradicted by
the great weight of the historical evidence, including their own . . . statements”
on other occasions, as well as by the text of Article III, by the reasons for the
new national government and the creation of the judicial power, and by the
opinions of other political leaders of the founding period.34
Professor Vicki C. Jackson, after a comprehensive historical study of federal
government immunity, identifies three possible historical sources for “the
remarkable staying power of the idea of federal sovereign immunity.”   First,35
although perhaps misunderstood and too broadly applied, English law, which
had so profound an influence on early American law, indeed did recognize
some form of sovereign immunity.   Second, the Constitution commits the36
power to appropriate money to the Congress,  thereby “lend[ing] force to the37
argument that money judgments against the United States cannot be paid
without an appropriation from Congress.”   Third, “Congress’s control over the38
jurisdiction of the federal courts gives it considerable powers simply to refuse
to authorize suits against the government.”   And, indeed, in the First Judiciary39
Act of 1789, Congress gave jurisdiction to the lower federal courts over cases
in which the United States was plaintiff or petitioner, thus implicitly prohibiting
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suits in which the federal government would be defendant.   Therefore,40
Jackson suggests, “some aspects of sovereign immunity doctrine — notably,
those relating to judicially compelled payments from Treasury funds — are
either required by, or consistent with, the U.S. Constitution at the federal
level.”   Moreover, she submits, “[w]hat we call the ‘sovereign immunity’ of41
the United States in many respects could be described instead as a particularized
elaboration of Congress’s control over the lower court’s jurisdiction.”42
As discussed below,  when the Supreme Court first gave considered43
attention to the concept of federal sovereign immunity and its application to
allegations of injury by an agent of that federal sovereign, a majority of the
Court was skeptical about the doctrine and open to alternative modes of action
that drained much of the vitality from it.  However, the Court subsequently
reinvigorated the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, and today it is well-
ensconced within the legal structure of federal government civil liability.44
B. The Evolution of the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity in the
Supreme Court
As Professor Vicki C. Jackson has noted, “[i]n 1882, . . . nearly a century
after adoption of the Constitution, the [Supreme] Court was split five to four on
the reasons for and scope of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity.”   At45
the same time, the Court had accepted federal sovereign immunity as a well-
established premise by that point, even if its justifications and contours
remained in doubt.  This 1882 decision was that of United States v. Lee,  which46
is the first in a series of three landmark decisions stretching over eighty years
that map the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity and its exceptions or
limitations.47
Significantly, in none of these three cases was the government itself actually
named as defendant to the action, at least by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court.  Rather, apparently recognizing sovereign immunity as an
insuperable obstacle to a direct action against the United States, the plaintiffs
in these actions attempted to avoid that bar by framing their complaints against
individual government officers, notwithstanding that the government plainly
would be affected as an entity by a judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.  The
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question in these three cases was whether this legal fiction — that a suit for
affirmative relief against a government agent is not the equivalent of an action
against the government itself and thus not barred by sovereign immunity —
should be sustained.
C. United States v. Lee
The first in this series of three federal sovereign immunity decisions is the
doctrinally important and historically interesting case of United States v. Lee.48
The case arose from the seizure of the Arlington estate of Confederate General
Robert E. Lee by Federal forces during the Civil War and the establishment of
a military cemetery on the site.49
In 1778, John Parke Custis — the adopted son of George Washington (who
married John’s mother, Martha Custis, a widow) — purchased a tract of land
along the Potomac River in Virginia.  Upon John’s untimely death as a young
man, his six-month-old son — George Washington Parke Custis — was
adopted by the grandparents, George and Martha Washington.  At the age of
twenty-one, young George assumed ownership of the land, which he named
“Arlington,” and built the family mansion upon it.  In 1831, his daughter, Mary
Anna, was married in the main hall of Arlington House to a young Army
lieutenant named Robert E. Lee.  Upon the death of George Washington Parke
Custis in 1857, the estate was inherited by his daughter and became the Lee
family home.
After General Lee accepted command of the Confederate Army of Northern
Virginia upon the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the Lee family was forced
to flee the Arlington estate.  Federal troops occupied the estate and a Union
general used the mansion as his headquarters.  Unionists regarded the mansion
looking down over the river toward Washington, D.C. as a defiant symbol of
the confederate military leader whom they regarded as a traitor.  In 1864,
General Montgomery Meigs recommended that a portion of the property
around the Arlington mansion be used as a military graveyard for Northern war
dead, making the property uninhabitable should the Lee family ever return.
Although it may be an apocryphal story, General Meigs — whose own son later
was killed in the war and is buried at Arlington — is reported to have said that
if Mrs. Lee returned to the house and looked out of her window, she would see
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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the graves of the Union soldiers her husband had killed, buried in her rose
garden.
The Arlington estate had been transferred to the United States through
purchase at a tax sale after the Custis-Lee family allegedly failed to pay taxes
on the property.  In fact, Mrs. Lee was quite willing to pay the taxes due on the
property — only about $100 — and sent an agent with the necessary funds to
the federal commissioners collecting the taxes.  The federal commissioners
refused to accept payment and insisted that the taxpayer must appear in person
to pay the taxes.  Not surprisingly, the wife of General Lee was unwilling to
travel behind Union lines to appear before the federal commissioners.
However, when this legal question had arisen in a previous case, the Supreme
Court interpreted the pertinent statute to permit payment of the taxes by an
agent, which accounts for the government’s later loss on the merits regarding
the validity of the transfer of the Lee Arlington estate at the tax sale.  When the
eldest son of General and Mrs. Lee ultimately filed the lawsuit for ejectment
against an individual government officer that later came before the Supreme
Court, the jury concluded that the tender of payment had been sufficient and
thus the tax sale had been improper and failed to transfer title to the
government.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee, the federal
government legally purchased the property from Lee for the sum of $150,000,
and today it remains a national military cemetery and military installation.
In a closely-divided decision, with sharp disagreement among the Justices
over the scope and the very legitimacy of sovereign immunity in a republic, the
Court in Lee permitted the suit to go forward against the military officers
occupying the land and ordered restoration of the property to General Lee’s son.
Justice Miller, writing for the majority in Lee, surveyed the history of sovereign
immunity in the United States and its predecessor, Great Britain.50
Acknowledging the English practice, by which an individual had to petition the
crown for the right to sue, Justice Miller protested that no true analogy exists
in the American republic, “as there is no such thing as a kingly head to the
nation.”   In sum, Justice Miller questioned the fitness of sovereign immunity51
as a legal doctrine in a republican state without a personal sovereign.  Although
federal sovereign immunity had become “established doctrine” in the United
States, Justice Miller suggested it had assumed that position without careful
analysis in prior decisions and without any principled basis.52
Still, even accepting per precedent the proposition that the sovereign United
States itself may not be made the subject of suit without its consent, Justice
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Miller declined to extend sovereign immunity to cover an action framed against
an individual, even if that individual were an officer of the United States.   The53
doctrine, the majority ruled, “is not permitted to interfere with the judicial
enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs when the United States is not
a defendant or a necessary party to the suit.”   Because the United States is a54
republican state, Justice Miller insisted that the officers of the government
cannot be treated as the embodiment of the sovereign in the manner of a queen
and her court.   Moreover, in the United States, every person, even an officer55
near to the seat of power, remains subject to the rule of law:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.  No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.  All
the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.56
As for the concern that the Executive’s ability to exercise public duties
would be impaired if his officers were subject to the harassment of litigation,
the majority was not convinced that making the government amenable to suit
would impair the workings of government.   Justice Miller dismissed as57
“imaginary” any fear that permitting suits against federal officers or agents
would undermine the essential functions of government, such as that vessels of
war or military forts might be invaded by citizen suits in times of peril.   The58
Court observed that properties held by the military had been recovered through
legal action in the past without consequent disaster.59
That the case involved the seizure of property by the government from a
private citizen provided an additional and constitutional justification for the
majority’s holding in Lee.   Indeed, this “taking” factor became the key to60
understanding and applying this precedent when the Supreme Court revisited
it in the next century.   When the United States takes property without giving61
just compensation, the government’s conduct offends the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.   Justice Miller compared the Fifth Amendment protection62
of property to the use of the petition for habeas corpus to protect the
individual’s constitutional rights of life and liberty:
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If this constitutional provision is a sufficient authority for the court
to interfere to rescue a prisoner from the hands of those holding him
under the asserted authority of the government, what reason is there
that the same courts shall not give remedy to the citizen whose
property has been seized without due process of law, and devoted to
public use without just compensation?63
The majority thus strongly reaffirmed the role of the judicial branch as a
guardian of the citizen from abuse of power by other branches of government.64
Four Justices dissented in Lee.   Justice Gray’s dissenting opinion65
emphasized that the Arlington property had been held in the title of the United
States for many years.   The case did not involve a recent seizure of the66
property, nor was the suit maintained against the government officer who
actually seized it but rather against those officers presently holding it on behalf
of the federal government.   Rejecting the majority’s theory that this was a suit67
against individual officers and not against the sovereign, the dissent observed
that the federal government can only hold property through its agents.   Thus68
a suit to recover property claimed by the United States that was brought against
agents of the government was, in reality, a suit against the United States.69
Furthermore, Justice Gray argued, the principle of sovereign immunity was
necessary not only in a monarchy, but in any nation.   If the government were70
to survive, it must not be dispossessed of forts, ships of war, or other property
without its consent.   The government could not conduct its vital affairs if it71
were made subject to unlimited lawsuits, whether or not those actions were
styled as against its officers.  Thus, the dissent believed, if the United States
were to be sued, the waiver of sovereign immunity should come from Congress,
which undoubtedly would develop appropriate procedures to protect
government interests.72
In the end, the sovereign United States was directly affected by the outcome
of the action in Lee; the government, and not the officers, suffered the
(temporary) loss of the Arlington property.  The majority’s theory that this was
merely a suit against federal officers, and not against the government itself,
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plainly rested upon a legal fiction.  Given that the majority questioned the
legitimacy of sovereign immunity as a threshold matter, those members of the
Court understandably were not troubled that such an officer suit might prove to
be an end-run around sovereign immunity.  Did the Lee decision then set the
stage for the abolition, or at least the curtailment, of sovereign immunity as a
doctrine?  As we will find, not in the end.
In your author’s opinion, the Lee majority intended to open the door widely
to citizen suits against government officers.  Indeed, the Court was sufficiently
dubious about the place of sovereign immunity in a republic as to be untroubled
that the legal fiction of a direct officer suit might leave the governmental
stronghold unsecured against judicial actions to redress government
wrongdoing.  While the Lee majority remarked that the challenged
governmental misconduct in the case rose to a constitutional level, your author
reads the opinion to offer this point as but merely one more reason to permit the
suit, not as the sole or crucial reason.  Nonetheless, as seen below, this
constitutional dimension of Lee became the linchpin when the Supreme Court
revisited this precedent in the twentieth century.  As so reinterpreted, the Lee
precedent leaves the door of sovereign immunity only slightly ajar.
D. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.
The second case in the sovereign immunity series is Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp.,  decided by the Supreme Court in 1949.  After73
World War II, the War Assets Administration allegedly had entered into a
contract to sell surplus coal to Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., the
plaintiff.   Subsequently, the Administration refused to deliver the coal to74
Domestic and instead executed a new contract to sell it to someone else.75
Plaintiff Domestic filed suit against Robert Littlejohn, the head of the War
Assets Administration, seeking (1) an injunction preventing sale of the coal to
anyone other than Domestic, and (2) a declaration that Domestic’s contract with
the government was valid and that the contract with the other buyer was
invalid.76
In essence, the plaintiff Domestic sought to transform a contract grievance
with the federal government into a dispute with an individual government
officer who purportedly should be restrained from violating the law.  The
officer was not a party to the contract, nor could it be doubted that the relief
sought would impinge directly upon the government itself.  Of course,
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reframing a complaint with the government itself into a mere quarrel with an
individual government agent is exactly what had occurred seventy years earlier
in Lee, in which the suit was permitted to go forward notwithstanding sovereign
immunity.   On this occasion, however, the outcome proved to be quite77
different.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Supreme Court majority in Larson,
firmly rejected the argument that the denomination of the party defendant
determined the applicability of sovereign immunity.   The Court was unwilling78
to countenance the fiction that a suit against an officer invariably may be
distinguished from one against the United States simply by the arrangement of
names in the pleading.  Instead, Chief Justice Vinson said, the Court must look
to the relief sought in the suit to determine whether, although nominally framed
against an officer, the complaint in reality is pressed against the federal
government itself:
In each such case [where specific relief is sought] the question is
directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief against the officer,
relief will not, in effect, be obtained against the sovereign.  For the
sovereign can act only through agents and, when an agent’s actions
are restrained, the sovereign itself may, through him, be restrained.
. . .  In each such case the compulsion, which the court is asked to
impose, may be compulsion against the sovereign, although
nominally directed against the individual officer.  If it is, then the
suit is barred, not because it is a suit against an officer of the
Government, but because it is, in substance, a suit against the
Government over which the court, in the absence of consent, has no
jurisdiction.79
Beyond suits involving the personal activities of the officer, which obviously
do not involve the federal government, the Larson Court articulated two
instances in which an officer would be regarded as acting separately from the
government and thus subject to individual suit without sovereign immunity
implications.80
First, when an officer acts beyond his delegated authority under a statute, he
then is not acting as an agent of the government; his actions beyond statutory
limitations are considered “individual and not sovereign actions.”   If the81
officer is “not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him to
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do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden,” then his
actions are ultra vires and a suit for specific relief against the officer may
proceed.82
Second, when an officer acts pursuant to statutory authority, but his conduct
breaches constitutional margins, the suit may proceed against the officer
individually.   “Here, too,” the Court held, “the conduct against which specific83
relief is sought is beyond the officer’s powers and is, therefore, not the conduct
of the sovereign.”   A petition for habeas corpus, by which a court may order84
an officer to surrender a person who is being held unconstitutionally — even
if held pursuant to the officer’s statutory authority — was adduced by the Court
as an illustration.85
As for the suggestion that Lee stands as precedent for a broader avenue of
relief against government officers, Chief Justice Vinson characterized Lee as a
particular example of a government officer acting in contravention of a
constitutional limitation on authority, specifically the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and thus falling within the Court’s articulation of a second
category of permissible officer suits.   Because the holding of the property86
without compensation in Lee violated the Constitution, the officer in that case
was acting without legitimate authority and the suit to regain the property
therefore “was not a suit against the sovereign and could be maintained against
the defendants as individuals.”87
The Court then concluded that the claim pressed in Larson was not properly
presented against an officer rather than the federal government, given that there
was no assertion that the administrator of the War Assets Administration had
violated some statutory limit on his authority or that his actions exceeded
constitutional boundaries.   To be sure, it was alleged that the administrator’s88
conduct was illegal, but that assertion went to the merits of the case; the claims
of illegality were based upon substantive law, not the threshold question of the
agent’s authority.   There was no suggestion that the administrator acted89
beyond his delegated authority, the Court concluded.   Only conduct that90
exceeds delegated authority, statutory or constitutional, separates an individual
officer from the sovereign government.91
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Finally, the Larson Court turned back the argument that “the principle of
sovereign immunity is an archaic holdover not consonant with modern morality
and that it should therefore be limited whenever possible.”   Although Chief92
Justice Vinson acknowledged that a damage claim may not much interfere with
governmental prerogatives and observed that Congress increasingly had
authorized such suits, public policy still precluded the government from being
subjected to judicial actions for specific relief:  “The Government, as
representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by
any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract right.”93
The Court concluded that, “in the absence of a claim of constitutional
limitation, the necessity of permitting the Government to carry out its functions
unhampered by direct judicial intervention outweighs the possible disadvantage
to the citizen in being relegated to the recovery of money damages after the
event.”94
Justice Frankfurter, joined by one other member of the Court, dissented in
Larson, directly disputing the very concept of sovereign immunity.   Justice95
Frankfurter argued that the Court needed to reconcile conflicting approaches
reflected in its decisions, which sometimes said that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is disfavored, while at other times strictly applied the doctrine to bar
suit.   In contrast with the majority, Justice Frankfurter cited Lee as standing96
for the general proposition that sovereign immunity does not shelter the
governmental agent from suit, because the rule of law applies to all, including
officers.   Arguing that sovereign immunity, as a discredited doctrine, should97
not be extended, Justice Frankfurter would have permitted direct officer suits
unless and until Congress acted to create a separate judicial remedy directly
against the federal government:
[T]he policy behind the immunity of the sovereign from suit without
its consent does not call for disregard of a citizen’s right to pursue
an agent of the government for a wrongful invasion of a recognized
legal right unless the legislature deems it appropriate to displace the
right of suing the individual defendant with the right to sue the
Government.98
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E. Malone v. Bowdoin
The final case in this series of landmark sovereign immunity decisions is that
of Malone v. Bowdoin,  decided by the Supreme Court in 1962.  Malone99
reinforced and extended the Larson rule and thus further solidified the doctrine
of federal sovereign immunity.  In Malone, plaintiffs claiming proper title to
land occupied by the government brought an ejectment action against a Forest
Service officer to recover the property.   In sum, the factual scenario was100
almost identical to that of Lee, as was the claimants’ legal argument that a suit
for specific relief against the officer should be permitted, notwithstanding
sovereign immunity.  However, the legal landscape had changed significantly
with consolidation of the federal sovereign immunity doctrine in Larson and
through the emergence of an alternative means for judicial relief afforded by
Congress that had not been available eighty years earlier.  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held sovereign immunity barred this officer suit.101
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court majority in Malone, stated that the
Supreme Court in Larson had “thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions,
and made an informed and carefully considered choice between the seemingly
conflicting precedents.”   The Larson decision, Justice Stewart summarized,102
expressly postulated the rule that the action of a federal officer . . .
can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief . . . only if the
officer’s action is “not within the officer’s statutory powers or, if
within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the
particular case, are constitutionally void.”103
While Lee was not overruled in Larson, Justice Stewart acknowledged that
the Court had interpreted Lee “as simply ‘a specific application of the
constitutional exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.’”   Moreover,104
at the time Lee was decided, a citizen who had suffered a seizure of property by
the government had no judicial avenue for relief.  Congress subsequently
authorized compensation for such takings by a special tribunal.   In105
conclusion, Justice Stewart said, no claim of an unconstitutional taking without
just compensation was or could be advanced in Malone, nor was there any other
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assertion that the government officer “was exceeding his delegated powers as
an officer of the United States.”106
Justice Douglas, joined by one other member of the Court, dissented,  in an107
opinion that proved to be something of a last gasp — on the Court — by the
anti-sovereign immunity theorists.  Justice Douglas viewed Lee as a sturdier
precedent of continued broad application that should be read generally to
remove sovereign immunity as an obstacle to suits against agents of the
government for alleged unlawful conduct.   As had the Lee majority and108
Justice Frankfurter in his Larson dissent, Justice Douglas contended that the
rule of law applies to all individuals, whether or not they are acting as agents
of the federal government.   Justice Douglas directly urged the abandonment109
of sovereign immunity as a concept that “has become more and more out of
date, as the powers of the Government and its vast bureaucracy have
increased.”   At least when a citizen claims legal title to property, Justice110
Douglas saw “[t]he balance between the convenience of the citizen and the
management of public affairs” as coming down “on the side of the citizen.”111
III. A Summary of the Current Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and Statutory
Waivers of Immunity
A. The Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity and Direct Officer Suits
Following the landmark Larson and Malone decisions, the current doctrine
of federal sovereign immunity may be summarized as follows: the United States
may not be sued without its consent, that is, without a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity.  Thus, if a civil action is pleaded directly against the
government, or one of its departments or agencies, the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity stands as a bar to the lawsuit unless and until Congress
chooses to lift that bar and then only to the extent or degree that Congress
chooses to do so.  Likewise, if a civil action is framed against a federal
government officer or agent based on the performance of governmental duties,
that officer or agent ordinarily will be regarded as having acted on behalf of the
federal government.  Thus, notwithstanding the denomination of an individual
officer as the defendant, the lawsuit will be recognized in substance as one
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against the federal government and accordingly as subject to the constraints of
federal sovereign immunity.
However, under the Larson-Malone sovereign immunity doctrine, a suit may
be maintained directly against a governmental officer under two
circumstances.   First, if the officer allegedly acted outside of the authority112
conferred upon his or her office by Congress, that is, beyond delegated statutory
power, then his or her conduct will be treated as individual in nature and will
be neither attributed to the sovereign nor barred by sovereign immunity.113
Second, if the officer acted within the conferred statutory limits of the office,
but his or her conduct allegedly offended a provision of the Constitution, then
sovereign immunity again is lifted.   In sum, when a government officer acts114
beyond legitimate authority, in either statutory or constitutional terms,
sovereign immunity will not be recognized as an obstacle to legal action —
although, as mentioned below, Congress may adopt alternative means for
remedying such legal complaints.
With respect to the second or “unconstitutional conduct” category, the
Larson Court offered two alternative ways of understanding the principle
behind the power to bring a suit against a government officer who has acted in
an unconstitutional manner.  First, the Court stated that a suit is permitted
against a federal officer under this circumstance because “the powers [of the
officer], or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.”115
This language suggests that Larson’s “unconstitutional conduct” rule is a
species of the ultra vires concept.  By this understanding, a government officer
whose authority is not validly conferred or exercised because of a constitutional
limitation is not truly acting as an agent of the government, because the
government may not authorize an agent to violate the Constitution.   Second,116
the Court described the rule permitting suit against a government officer acting
in violation of the Constitution as “the constitutional exception to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.”   This statement appears to acknowledge that the117
actions of the agent indeed are attributable to the government principal, but that
sovereign immunity should not be available to the government when it behaves
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unconstitutionally through its agents.  In other words, the first understanding
preserves sovereign immunity inviolate, but only through the fiction that a
government officer acting beyond constitutional parameters thereby loses his
or her status as an agent of the sovereign and thus is acting ultra vires.  The
second understanding does treat the actions of the agent as those of the
principal, but pierces through sovereign immunity to hold the government
directly liable for unconstitutional actions.
The first understanding of the Larson “unconstitutional conduct” rule
perpetuates an unnecessary legal fiction.  If an officer acts pursuant to statutory
authority but in derogation of the Constitution, the government itself acts
unconstitutionally.  Accordingly, the government should be held directly
accountable as an entity.  Moreover, when an agent acts within the scope of his
or her office, but contravenes the Constitution, a litigation remedy, especially
one for specific relief enjoining or mandating different action by the officer,
almost certainly will impact the federal government itself and thus should be
appreciated as a judicial decree against the government.  Accordingly, this
second category of permissible suits under Larson is best understood as a
constitutional exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity itself, rather than
as a basis for bringing suit against an individual officer.
Although the Larson-Malone precedential pair continues to state the
fundamentals of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the practical impact of these
decisions has been both diminished and redirected as Congress has enacted a
diverse set of sovereign immunity waivers and made alternative provision for
certain types of claims against governmental officers or employees, as
discussed below.
B. The Proliferation of Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
Over the past century and a half, Congress has gradually lowered the shield
of sovereign immunity, making the United States amenable to suit in most areas
of substantive law and covering most situations in which an injured party would
desire relief.   “Congressional enactments thereby have woven a broad118
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tapestry of authorized judicial actions against the federal government.”119
Although these statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity have been
enacted piecemeal by Congress over the course of 150 years, they nevertheless
fit together into a reasonably well-integrated pattern of causes of action
covering most subjects of dispute between the government and its citizens.
As for direct suits against individual government officers, the reader here
may be curious as to how the plaintiffs’ claims in the Larson and Malone cases
would be resolved today.  In Larson, the plaintiff sought something analogous
to specific performance in contract against the government.   In Malone, the120
plaintiff sought to eject the government officer from land to which he claimed
title.   In both cases, the plaintiffs thus sought specific or affirmative relief121
from the government.  Although the Supreme Court held that the Larson and
Malone lawsuits were barred by sovereign immunity, Congress of course may
waive that immunity and consent to suit, subject to procedural and remedial
limitations it thinks appropriate.   And, indeed, Congress generally has waived122
the sovereign immunity of the government to authorize suits against
government officers for specific relief under the Administrative Procedure
Act,  regardless of whether the governmental officer was acting within or123
without statutory and constitutional authority.  However, specific relief is not
available under all circumstances.  In contract cases, such as Larson, specific
performance traditionally may not be sought from the federal government;
instead, an aggrieved party generally must maintain an action for damages for
breach of contract.   Similarly, in cases involving a taking of private property124
by the government, such as presented in Malone (and earlier in Lee), a plaintiff
generally is relegated to an action for compensation under the Tucker Act.125
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Importantly, however, in these kinds of cases, Congress has afforded some
remedy in court, even if it may not be the particular remedy an individual
plaintiff might prefer.
Moreover, Congress, by means of legislation, has largely superseded the
ultra vires basis for direct officer suits by providing an immediate remedy
against the government itself and making that remedy against the government
exclusive in some circumstances.  If specific or equitable-type relief is sought,
then the Administrative Procedure Act ordinarily provides the vehicle for
judicial review, as noted.  If monetary damages are sought through allegation
of tortious wrongdoing, then Congress has directed substitution of the United
States as the defendant whenever the government employee had been acting
within the scope of employment — an inquiry that is not invariably identical to
that of determining whether the employee complied fastidiously with every
statutory directive.126
In sum, the battleground over sovereign immunity has shifted from common-
law claims against government officers to statutory claims presented pursuant
to congressional waivers of sovereign immunity.  This article next addresses
judicial construction of those statutory waivers.
IV. Judicial Construction of Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
A. The General Rule of Strict Construction
In addition to the foregoing summary of the concept of sovereign immunity,
its historical origins, how it evolved as a doctrine in the Supreme Court, and the
justifications for or critiques of the concept, one remaining aspect of federal
sovereign immunity — the matter of statutory construction — should be
addressed.  Even when Congress has waived sovereign immunity by enacting
legislation granting express permission to seek judicial relief against the federal
government, the doctrine exerts a pervasive influence upon the statutory
analysis.  With the underlying legal environment framed by sovereign
immunity, the omnipresence of this foundational doctrine significantly affects
the manner in which the courts approach the task of construing statutory
waivers.  Congress’s consent to suit for a particular type of claim does not
wholly deprive the federal government of the protective benefits of the
sovereign immunity.
For claims to be brought against and judgments to be paid by the United
States, there must be an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.   Even when127
the basic grant of legislative permission is sufficiently unambiguous, the
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Supreme Court has directed that the contours of a statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity are to be construed strictly and narrowly.   Because Congress alone128
may waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, the codified terms of
such waivers define the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain an action against
the government.   The Supreme Court has solidified this rule of strict129
construction by refusing to extend the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity
when the language of the statute leaves any ambiguity and by declining to look
beyond the text to legislative history or statutory purpose.130
Commentators have described the Court’s decisions as establishing a “clear
statement” rule, that is, demanding a plain and unequivocal expression by
Congress in the text of the statute concerning the scope of any waiver of federal
sovereign immunity.   Professor John Copeland Nagle explains that the131
Supreme Court requires “specifically targeted statutory language and refuse[s]
to consider other indicia of legislative intent” in the construction of a statutory
grant of judicial relief against the federal government.   Nagle criticizes the132
requirement of a “clear statement,” complaining that “while it is easy for
Congress to write a provision that waives sovereign immunity generally, it is
difficult for Congress to write a provision that specifies the scope of a waiver
of sovereign immunity.”   He argues that “a clear statement rule threatens133
legislative supremacy, especially because Congress does not share the same
enthusiasm for sovereign immunity that the Court has demonstrated in its most
recent decisions.”134
With respect to the statutory interpretation dimension of the sovereign
immunity question, Professor Vicki C. Jackson argues that, in an era of greater
acceptance of the government’s amenability to suit and of judicial
independence, the “dynamic [should] move back towards more restrictive
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understandings of the doctrine’s scope” so as to enhance the “courts’ capacities
to provide individual justice.”   Even though the doctrine may never actually135
be abolished, Jackson argues that the “abstract idea of sovereign immunity”
should not be invoked to deny “remedies to address violations of legal rights”
in cases in which “there is room for interpretation on questions of jurisdiction
and remedies.”   In sum, Jackson also would favor a more generous136
construction of scope and remedy when Congress waives immunity to suit.
Nonetheless, commentators concede, under the Supreme Court’s “clear
statement” approach, doubts about the textual meaning of a statute are resolved
in favor of the preservation of sovereign immunity.  Moreover, as the strict
construction rule for waivers of sovereign immunity is not a recent innovation,
Congress has legislated for many decades against this well-understood
backdrop.
While the Supreme Court generally adheres to a narrow interpretation
approach and regularly recites that standard, the Court’s opinions concerning
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are not entirely of one unbroken piece.
There are small cracks in the edifice of strict construction.  Although no
Supreme Court Justices have directly questioned the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in recent years, their conflicting attitudes toward the concept may be
revealed by their citation of contrasting standards of statutory construction, or
at least contrasting applications of such standards in some cases.
B. A Pair of Contrasting Decisions Involving the Same Statutory Waiver
As an illustration of the tension that continues about the appropriate manner
in which to interpret a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, we may
compare two Supreme Court decisions that interpret the same statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity — the provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that prohibits employment discrimination by federal employers.   These137
two decisions point in somewhat opposite directions in terms of underlying
presumptions for interpretive analysis:
First, in Library of Congress v. Shaw,  the Supreme Court strictly construed138
the amenability to suit of the United States under Title VII and refused to hold
the government responsible for prejudgment interest on attorney’s fees  —139
even though private defendants long had been liable for such interest and Title
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142. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079.
143. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 350 F.3d 1216, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding
that Border Patrol employees who were awarded overtime pay could not obtain prejudgment
interest); Smith v. Principi, 281 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a veteran who
was awarded past-due compensation after successfully challenging disability rating could not
recover interest because the statutes did not mention interest and thus did not expressly waive
the no-interest rule); Newton v. Capital Assurance Co., 245 F.3d 1306, 1310-12 (11th Cir. 2001)
(holding that prejudgment interest could not be awarded to successful claimant for flood
insurance benefits where insurer was subsidized by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and any interest payment would be a direct charge against the public treasury).  On the
availability of interest on judgments against the federal government, see generally SISK, supra
note 105, § 1.10(c), at 70-72.
144. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
145. Id. at 93-96.
146. Id. at 97-100 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
147. Id. at 95 (majority opinion).
VII defined the liability of the United States to be “the same as a private
person.”   Stating that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly140
construed in favor of the sovereign, the Court demanded that Congress
affirmatively and separately declare liability for interest before such a remedy
will be held available against the federal government.   Subsequently, in the141
Civil Rights Act of 1991,  Congress carefully used literal language to142
expressly allow awards of prejudgment interest in Title VII employment
discrimination suits against the federal government, thereby overturning Shaw
in the specific context of that particular statutory cause of action.  Nonetheless,
Shaw remains important as a statement of the general rule of strict construction
for waivers of sovereign immunity.  And the “no-interest rule” stated in Shaw
remains the rule in other contexts where Congress has not enacted specific
statutory provisions to the contrary.143
Second, but in contrast with Shaw, the Supreme Court in Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs  held that the limitations period on claims144
against the United States arising under that same statute — Title VII — need
not be strictly enforced; the Court allowed the Title VII limitations period to be
subject to equitable tolling in exceptional circumstances, just as with claims
against private parties.   A concurring opinion objected to equitable tolling145
against the federal government, citing longstanding precedents establishing that
conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity — specifically including statutes
of limitations — must be strictly observed.   The majority opinion simply146
responded that “making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against
the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts
to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.”147
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150. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261, 263 (1999) (stating
that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, must “be strictly construed, in terms of
its scope, in favor of the sovereign” and thus holding that the statute did not permit assertion
of an equitable lien by a subcontractor against funds held by the federal government which had
been distributed to the prime contractor); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 197 (1996) (stating
that “a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of
its scope, in favor of the sovereign” and holding that government was not liable for
compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act for employment discrimination on the basis
of disability); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-05 (1993) (holding that the United
States had not clearly consented to tort liability for incidents occurring in Antarctica); United
States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity
“‘must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign, and not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the
language requires’” and holding the government was not liable to bankruptcy trustee for funds
transferred without authorization by the bankrupt estate to the Internal Revenue Service
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)); Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
502 U.S. 129, 137, 139 (1991) (stating that “a partial waiver of sovereign immunity . . . must
Thus, in Shaw, the Supreme Court held that the government was not liable
for an award of interest — absent an express statutory provision — under a
general waiver of sovereign immunity, even if a private person would be so
liable.   But then in Irwin, the Court held that a limitations period was subject148
to equitable tolling even in the absence of an express statutory provision,
because equitable tolling would be available in cases involving private
parties.   The two decisions are in tension with each other and appear to149
approach the construction of the Title VII waiver of sovereign immunity from
opposite starting points or presumptions.
The question thus remains whether the Shaw  and Irwin decisions may be
reconciled in a principled manner.  The Supreme Court itself has yet to offer a
theory of statutory construction that encompasses these contrasting results,
which, as noted, arose in the context of the same statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity.  The only apparent distinction between Shaw and Irwin is that the
former refused to expand the scope of the government’s liability in damages,
while the latter permitted the easing of the time limitations on filing suit.  Thus,
one could articulate a strict and narrow rule of statutory construction that
applies to the substantive liability side of the sovereign immunity inquiry, while
another more generous interpretive approach governs the procedural side.
C. The Interpretive Tension Perpetuated in Recent Decisions
In the fifteen years since Irwin, as it has addressed various statutory waivers
of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has continued to demand clear and
unequivocal textual evidence before expansively construing the scope of a
statutory waiver — evidence the Court typically has found lacking.   Thus, the150
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Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504, did not permit award of attorney’s fees for administrative deportation
proceeding).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 153-61.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
153. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
154. Id. at 350-52.
155. Id. at 350.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 352.
158. 524 U.S. 38 (1998).
159. Id. at 48-49.
Shaw strict construction approach appears to predominate.  However, unless
and until Irwin has been either discarded by the Court as an anomalous opinion
or placed by the Court into a separate procedural category, the resilience of
Irwin reflects continuing tension about how to interpret statutes authorizing suit
against the federal government.  For a time, the Court appeared to be
abandoning Irwin, as the Court declined to allow equitable tolling of other
statutes of limitations in federal government cases.   Then recently, the Court151
revived Irwin as persuasive precedent for relaxing another procedural limitation
under another statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.   Thus, Irwin remains152
with us and so does the analytical tension that it introduced.
For a period of time after Irwin, the Supreme Court appeared set on a course
that limited Irwin as a precedent and seemed likely over time to confine it to its
specific statutory context.  In United States v. Brockamp,  the Court refused153
to permit equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period on filing claims for
tax refunds, notwithstanding that the taxpayers involved had suffered
disabilities that arguably excused their delay.   The Court distinguished Irwin154
by saying that the presumption that limitations periods for claims against the
government may be equitably tolled applies only to ordinary limitations statutes
that “use fairly simple language.”   By contrast, the Internal Revenue Code155
“sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that,
linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit
exceptions.”   The tax statute’s “detail, its technical language, the iteration of156
the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing
of exceptions, taken together, indicate to [the Court] that Congress did not
intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended ‘equitable’ exceptions into
the statute that it wrote.”   Similarly, in United States v. Beggerly,  the Court157 158
held that equitable tolling is not available in a suit against the United States
under the Quiet Title Act.   The Court observed that the Quiet Title Act159
provided an “unusually generous” twelve-year limitations period and that the
statute already incorporated a form of tolling, by providing that the limitations
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163. 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
164. Id. at 420-21.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).  On the Equal Access to Justice Act, see generally Gregory
C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994); Gregory C. Sisk,
The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
166. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 423.
167. Id. at 420-21.
period does not run until the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the claim
of the United States” upon the property.   Accordingly, the Court held that160
equitable tolling was inconsistent with the text of the statute.161
Thus, while the Irwin tolling rule continued to apply to ordinary and simple
limitations provisions that did little more than announce a time deadline, the
Court appeared increasingly reluctant to give an expansive interpretation to
Irwin and seemed quick to distinguish it in each successive case.  The
Brockamp decision — particularly in its description of equitable tolling as
embracing “unmentioned, open-ended ‘equitable’ exceptions” — suggested that
the Court was becoming less hospitable to equitable or expansive
interpretations of waivers of sovereign immunity than when the Irwin decision
was rendered.162
However, quite recently, Irwin’s more generous approach toward a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity, at least in the context of a procedural time
requirement, has received renewed vitality.  In Scarborough v. Principi,  the163
Supreme Court relied upon Irwin as instructive in another context that also
involved a time limitation contained in a waiver of sovereign immunity,
although it did not raise the question of equitable estoppel of that limitation.164
In Scarborough, the Court held, over a dissent, that an otherwise-timely
application for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act  that did165
not contain the statutorily-required allegation that the government’s position
was not “substantially justified” may be amended to cure this defect after the
thirty-day filing period had expired.   In so holding, the Court found the Irwin166
decision to be “enlightening on this issue,” because that precedent recognized
that limitation principles should apply to the federal government in the same
way as to private parties.   The Court further said that “[o]nce Congress167
waives sovereign immunity, we observed [in Irwin], judicial application of a
time prescription to suits against the Government, in the same way the
prescription is applicable to private suits, ‘amounts to little, if any, broadening
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171. 337 U.S. 682 (1949); see supra Part II.D.
172. 369 U.S. 643 (1962); see supra Part II.E.
173. See supra Parts III.B, IV.
of the congressional waiver.’”   Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in168
dissent, argued that the time limitation, including the requirement that the
claimant timely set forth each of the required elements for the fee application,
was “a condition on the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity,” and thus
was subject to the strict construction rule, citing Shaw and other precedents to
that effect.169
Thus, the tension of interpretive attitude exists and persists in Supreme Court
caselaw regarding the proper mode of construction for statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity.
V. Conclusion
As Professor Laurence H. Tribe writes, “the doctrine of sovereign immunity
is in no danger of falling out of official favor any time soon.”   Indeed, in the170
nearly half a century since the landmark decisions in Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp.,  and Malone v. Bowdoin,  no member of the171 172
Supreme Court has directly challenged the continued existence of federal
sovereign immunity as a basic doctrine, although not all jurists approach the
doctrine in the same manner in every case.
While sovereign immunity persists as a foundational concept underlying all
civil litigation with the federal government, the tensions created by the doctrine
— the conflicting considerations of justice to an injured citizen and
governmental effectiveness for the people collectively — persist as well.  In
recent decades, however, those concerns tend to find expression in
congressional deliberations about statutory waivers of sovereign immunity and
in sometimes contrasting judicial constructions of those enactments.   The173
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts continue to struggle with how to
approach those statutes that lift — always in part and never in whole — the
shield of sovereign immunity, seeking to give full force simultaneously to the
statutory authorization of relief and to those limitations on relief that Congress
saw fit to retain.
Congress has enacted statutory waivers of sovereign immunity that cover
most substantive areas of law and apply to most situations in which a plaintiff
would seek relief.  Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the
federal government retains advantages and immunities not available to private
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parties.  Moreover, while the statutory waivers of sovereign immunity do create
something of a broad network or tapestry of authorized judicial actions against
the government, they do not cover everything and each individual waiver is
subject to significant exceptions.  Congress has responded to the problem of
sovereign immunity, seeking to find the appropriate balance between allowing
access to court relief and protecting important governmental policy operations
from judicial intervention.  With the basic doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity having been capsulized in this article, an examination of how that
balance has been struck for different types of claims and different areas of
governmental activity is the subject for another day and forum.174
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